第 28 个主题,共 64 个· 政府绩效搭交付指标
按结果付费搭社会影响债券(PbR/SIB)
按结果付费(payment by results,PbR)是根据经过核实个成果来付钞票给服务提供方,而勿是根据做过个活动。社会影响债券(social impact bond,SIB)是一种具体个 PbR 融资结构:私人或者慈善投资者先出钞票资助服务交付,只有勒独立测量出来个成果达到商定门槛个辰光,政府委托方才偿还——还要带回报——搿样交付风险就从纳税人转到投资者身上。
为啥重要
全世界第一个 SIB 2010 年 9 月勒 HMP Peterborough(彼得伯勒监狱)启动:Social Finance 从 17 个投资者手里厢筹到 500 万镑,资助“One Service”,对象是短刑期囚犯(12 个月以下),目标是降低再犯;司法部搭大彩票基金(Big Lottery Fund)约定,只有再定罪事件比匹配个全国对照队列至少少 7.5%,才偿还投资者。彼得伯勒试点个最终队列记录到再定罪减少 9.7%,稳稳高过门槛,投资者拿到偿还还有回报。搿个机制要紧,是因为伊解决了一个具体个委托难题:政府想为成果而勿是投入付钞票,但是承担勿起一项可能无效个干预个财务风险,所以 SIB 结构拿搿个风险转给愿意承保个投资者。牛津大学布拉瓦特尼克政府学院(Blavatnik School of Government)个政府成果实验室(Government Outcomes Lab,GO Lab),现在维护着全世界关于 PbR 搭 SIB 表现最完整个公开证据库,追踪全球两百多只影响债券,并且发表研究,讲啥设计特征搭成功或失败相关。证据库一再回到个教训是:选定个成果指标,搭哪个承担达勿到个风险,几乎决定了一份 PbR 合同实际运行起来个其他一切。
数学
PbR payment = base payment (if any) + Σ (outcome achieved × unit price per outcome)
Social impact bond investor return:
Investor outlay = upfront capital funding service delivery
Outcome payment = commissioner pays only if outcome ≥ threshold, scaled by
how far above threshold performance lands
Investor return = outcome payments received − investor outlay
(a rate of return, often capped, reflecting risk taken)
Key design parameters that determine the whole contract's behaviour:
Outcome metric — must be an outcome, not an output (see outcomes-vs-outputs)
Comparison/counterfactual — usually a matched cohort (see counterfactual-analysis)
Payment threshold — minimum improvement before any payment triggers
Payment curve — linear, stepped, or capped above the threshold
Attribution/deadweight discount — see additionality-and-deadweight
实例演算
彼得伯勒 One Service(示意数字,取自已发表个评估):
Investor capital raised: £5,000,000
Cohort: ~3,000 short-sentence male prisoners over two cohorts
Threshold: ≥7.5% reduction in reconviction events vs matched
national comparison group, or no payment
Cohort 1 result: 8.4% reduction — below the contractual bar for that
cohort alone under the original rules
Combined/final cohort result: 9.7% reduction — above threshold
Outcome payment: government (Ministry of Justice / Big Lottery Fund)
pays per percentage point above threshold, funding
investor repayment plus a return
地方政府 PbR 合同(示例):一项家庭干预服务个委托价格是每个转介家庭 £4,000(活动付款),外加每个结案 12 个月后再无儿童保护转介个家庭 £6,000(成果付款)。转介 200 个家庭,结案 150 个,96 个勒 12 个月辰光依然呒没再转介:
Activity payment = 200 × £4,000 = £800,000
Outcome payment = 96 × £6,000 = £576,000
Total contract cost = £1,376,000 for 96 confirmed sustained outcomes
Cost per confirmed outcome ≈ £14,333 (see cost-per-outcome)
搭软件工程个关联
按结果付费首先是一个激励对齐问题,其次才是数据问题,而数据系统是搿个对齐守得住还是破脱个地方。独立、防篡改个成果核实是整个游戏个关键:一桩模棱两可个个案怎样编码,委托方搭提供方个激励是对立个,所以记录成果个系统要有审计轨迹,要搭独立核实方(往往是搭提供方勿同个机构,有辰光是拿警方或者福利记录来匹配个官方统计机构)签数据共享协议,要对成果定义做勿可篡改个版本管理——搿就是公共部门 KPI里“重新定义指标”陷阱勒 PbR 里厢个翻版。归因计算要靠反事实分析里厢个匹配队列方法,需要可重现、可审计个代码,而勿是一次性个电子表格。而且指标本身必须是真正个成果,勿是代理个活动——参见成果搭产出——因为一份为产出付钞票个 PbR 合同,只是拿原本个日常经费换个名字,还多了交易成本。SIB 个社会回报倘使要前瞻性地建模,评估通常直接借用社会投资回报率个方法。
容易踏个坑
- 为容易被钻空子个代理成果付钞票:“参加课程个次数”是装扮成成果个活动;要坚持用反映真正想要变化个指标(再犯、就业、住房稳定)。
- 呒没可信个反事实:呒没匹配个对照组,改善可能只是回归均值或者更大个趋势,勿是项目个效果——参见反事实分析搭增量搭无谓损失。
- 低估交易成本搭评估成本:PbR/SIB 方案个独立核实、数据关联搭合同管理,占合同价值个比例常常达到两位数——GO Lab 个证据库记录搿个是方案中止个反复出现个原因。
- 挑肥拣瘦或者“搁置”:按成果拿钞票个提供方,有直接个激励优先服务本来就大概率成功个客户,把最难个个案放勒后头——要设计分档付款或者个案组合调整来对付搿个问题。
资料来源
- Government Outcomes Lab, University of Oxford, Blavatnik School of Government. https://golab.bsg.ox.ac.uk/
- Social Finance, "Peterborough Social Impact Bond" evaluation summaries. https://golab.bsg.ox.ac.uk/case-studies/peterborough-social-impact-bond/
- Ministry of Justice, "Peterborough Social Impact Bond HMP Doncaster: Final Reconviction Results for the Peterborough Social Impact Bond."